transgender Senate staff on the 15-year anniversary of the association.

S. RES. 212

At the request of Ms. Murkowski. the names of the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Braun), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. MORAN), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. Sullivan), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. LANKFORD), the Senator from Utah (Mr. LEE), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. BARRASSO). the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CRAPO), the Senator from Montana (Mr. DAINES), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SHELBY), the Senator from Utah (Mr. ROMNEY), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Boozman), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. COTTON), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. THUNE), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. CAS-SIDY), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Toomey), the Senator from Texas (Mr. CORNYN), the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Johnson), the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. HOEVEN), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. ROUNDS), the Senator from Texas (Mr. CRUZ), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. ISAKSON), Senator from Georgia (Mr. PERDUE), the Senator from Florida (Mr. RUBIO), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. GARDNER) and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. ALEXANDER) were added as cosponsors of S. Res. 212, a resolution celebrating the 100th anniversary of the passage and ratification of the 19th Amendment, providing for women's suffrage, to the Constitution of the United States.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. WYDEN:

S. 1569. A bill to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to allow certain expenditures for cybersecurity-related services or assistance; to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Federal Campaign Cybersecurity Assistance Act of 2019—a bulky name for a bill that attempts to do a simply stated thing: protect our democracy from foreign cyber attacks. This bill allows the national campaign committees to provide much-needed cybersecurity assistance to State political parties, Federal campaign offices' staffs, and Federal candidates' personal accounts and devices.

In 2015 and 2016, hackers working for the Russian government penetrated the networks of the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. The hackers also compromised the email account of Senator Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign manager, John Podesta. The Russian government subsequently leaked and weaponized Democratic party and campaign emails in order to influence the outcome of several elections—most publicly, the presidential race between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, but also

U.S. House of Representatives races in Illinois, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Hackers also targeted Republicans during the same period, but were less successful in their efforts.

The impact of Russia's hacking-enabled influence campaign was a surprise to many. However, this was not the first time that a foreign government hacked into the campaign organization of someone running to be President of the United States. Senior officials from the 2008 Obama and McCain presidential campaigns have publicly confirmed that both organizations were compromised by hackers. In an interview with NBC News 2013, Dennis Blair, who served as President Obama's Director of National Intelligence between 2009 and 2010 stated that "Based on evervthing I know, this was a case of political cyber-espionage by the Chinese government against the two American political parties. They were looking for positions on China, surprises that might be rolled out by campaigns against China."

In recent years, the Republican National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and the the National Republican Congressional Committee have all been hacked, as well as the campaigns of Senators Graham and McCain. Both major political parties have suffered hacks, and will undoubtedly continue to be targeted by foreign governments and other sophisticated hackers.

Over the past two years, Congress has turned its attention to several weaknesses in our democracy that were exploited by Russia including the role of social media companies and longstanding flaws in paperless voting machines used in several states. While these issues have yet to be meaningfully addressed, they have, at least, been the subject of oversight hearings and legislative proposals in Congress. In contrast, Congress has yet to hold a single hearing on the vulnerability of political parties and campaigns to hacking by foreign governments, nor has anyone else in Congress introduced legislation to help defend these organizations from cyber attacks.

For the sake of the integrity of the American political process, I introduce this bill today to protect those running for office, and the organizations that support them, from cyber attacks. Russia's hacking and leaking of emails in 2016 is now well documented. Their efforts continue. If you think they aren't working towards the 2020 federal elections as hard as any cub reporter in Iowa, you'd be sadly mistaken. And they are likely NOT alone. Other hostile governments will undoubtedly seek to emulate and improve on Russia's tactics.

Congress has acted in the past to protect those running for office from serious threats. After Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1968, Congress authorized the Secret Service to protect Presidential and Vice Presi-

dential candidates. In extending Secret Service protection to candidates, Congress recognized that the threats to Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates required professional protection. Congress must now take action to protect candidates for Federal office—and consequently, our democracy—from another serious threat: hacking by foreign governments.

The political parties are best of the available options to provide cybersecurity to campaigns. Politicians are already dependent upon the parties for fundraising, advertising, polling, messaging, and other forms of support. Giving parties the responsibility to provide cybersecurity does not make politicians dependent on help from a new entity. Parties are also responsible to politicians they protect, moreso at least than any other government, corporate, or non-profit entity.

Quite simply, this bill gives the national campaign committees the role of the "IT Department" for state parties, campaigns, and candidates. The committees will be able to provide these entities with securely configured laptops and cellphones, professionally administered email, encrypted messaging, and collaboration software, and if necessary, hire third-party cybersecurity experts to help in the event of a successful hack.

This bill also permits the national parties to provide this assistance with money they raise in their "building fund." The building fund is one of three supplementary accounts through which Congress permitted the national campaign committees to raise an additional \$100,000 per individual, per year, to pay for the cost of presidential nominating conventions, national party headquarters buildings, and election recounts and other legal battles.

I know that some advocates have serious concerns about the building fund and the other supplementary accounts created by Congress in 2014. I share these concerns, and have long supported bold reforms of our campaign finance system. However, the current Senate is extremely unlikely to pass legislation creating public financing of elections anytime soon, and so while we have the current system, permitting the use of money in the building fund for cybersecurity appears to be the least bad option. Most importantly, this approach does not permit the parties to raise any new funds—it merely permits a new use of money raised through the building fund.

I am not the only one to recognize the severity of the cyber threat aimed at political parties. Earlier this year, the Canadian agency responsible for government cybersecurity, the Communications Security Establishment, issued a lengthy report on threats to elections, which noted that that "Globally, political parties, candidates, and their staff remain attractive targets for cyber threat activity." Likewise, the Maryland Board of Elections published guidance last week, recognizing

that "Campaigns are a potential cyber target," and consequently permitted state political parties to provide additional cybersecurity assistance to campaigns.

November 2020 gets closer by the day. Congress cannot wait any longer to protect state parties, campaigns, and the candidates themselves from sophisticated cyber attacks. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to promptly act on this legislation, and to secure our democracy from cyber threats before it is too late.

By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. Scott of South Carolina, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. YOUNG, Ms. DUCKWORTH, Mr. PORTMAN, Mr. KAINE, and Ms. SMITH):

S. 1583. A bill to amend the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act to provide for additional procedures for families with children under the age of 6, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1583

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Lead-Safe Housing for Kids Act of 2019".

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE LEAD-BASED PAINT POISONING PREVENTION

Section 302(a) of the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (42 U.S.C. 4822(a)) is amended—

- (1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
- (2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
- "(4) Additional procedures for families with children under the age of 6.—
 - "(A) RISK ASSESSMENT.—
- ''(i) DEFINITION.—In this subparagraph, the term 'covered housing'— $\,$
- "(I) means housing receiving Federal assistance described in paragraph (1) that was constructed prior to 1978; and
- "(II) does not include—
- "(aa) single-family housing covered by an application for mortgage insurance under the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); or
- "(bb) multi-family housing that—
- "(AA) is covered by an application for mortgage insurance under the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); and
- "(BB) does not receive any other Federal housing assistance.
- "(ii) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Lead-Safe Housing for Kids Act of 2019, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations that—
- "(I) require the owner of covered housing in which a family with a child of less than 6 years of age will reside or is expected to reside to conduct an initial risk assessment for lead-based paint hazards—

"(aa) in the case of covered housing receiving tenant-based rental assistance under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f), not later than 15 days after the date on which the family and the

owner submit a request for approval of a tenancy or lease renewal, whichever occurs first:

"(bb) in the case of covered housing receiving public housing assistance under the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq.) or project-based rental assistance under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f), not later than 15 days after the date on which a physical condition inspection occurs; and

"(cc) in the case of covered housing not described in item (aa) or (bb), not later than a date established by the Secretary;

"(II) provide that a visual assessment alone is not sufficient for purposes of complying with subclause (I);

"(III) require that, if lead-based paint hazards are identified by an initial risk assessment conducted under subclause (I), the owner of the covered housing shall—

"(aa) not later than 30 days after the date on which the initial risk assessment is conducted, control the lead-based paint hazards, including achieving clearance in accordance with regulations promulgated under section 402 or 404 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2682, 2684), as applicable; and

"(bb) provide notice to all residents in the covered housing affected by the initial risk assessment, and provide notice in the common areas of the covered housing, that lead-based paint hazards were identified and will be controlled within the 30-day period described in item (aa); and

"(IV) provide that there shall be no extension of the 30-day period described in subclause (III)(aa).

"(iii) EXCEPTIONS.—The regulations promulgated under clause (ii) shall provide an exception to the requirement under subclause (I) of such clause for covered housing—

"(I) if the owner of the covered housing submits to the Secretary documentation—

"(aa) that the owner conducted a risk assessment of the covered housing for lead-based paint hazards during the 12-month period preceding the date on which the family is expected to reside in the covered housing;

"(bb) of any clearance examinations of lead-based paint hazard control work resulting from the risk assessment described in item (aa):

"(II) from which all lead-based paint has been identified and removed and clearance has been achieved in accordance with regulations promulgated under section 402 or 404 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2682, 2684), as applicable:

"(III)(aa) if lead-based paint hazards are identified in the dwelling unit in the covered housing in which the family will reside or is expected to reside:

"(bb) the dwelling unit is unoccupied;

"(cc) the owner of the covered housing, without any further delay in occupancy or increase in rent, provides the family with another dwelling unit in the covered housing that has no lead-based paint hazards; and

"(dd) the common areas servicing the new dwelling unit have no lead-based paint hazards; and

"(IV) in accordance with any other standard or exception the Secretary deems appropriate based on health-based standards.

"(B) RELOCATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Lead-Safe Housing for Kids Act of 2019, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to provide that a family with a child of less than 6 years of age that occupies a dwelling unit in covered housing in which lead-based paint hazards were identified, but not controlled in accordance with regulations required under clause (ii), may relocate on an emergency basis and without placement on any waitlist, penalty

(including rent payments to be made for that dwelling unit), or lapse in assistance to—

"(i) a dwelling unit that was constructed in 1978 or later; or

"(ii) another dwelling unit in covered housing that has no lead-based paint hazards.".

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out the amendments made by section 2 such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2020 through 2024.

SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

SENATE RESOLUTION 214—RECOGNIZING THE HISTORY AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF MUSLIMS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. BOOKER (for himself, Mr. CASEY, Ms. HARRIS, Mr. PETERS, Mrs. MURRAY, and Ms. STABENOW) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. RES. 214

Whereas the millions of Muslims of the United States, immigrant and native born—
(1) compose 2 percent of the total popu-

lation of the United States; and

(2) have built a vibrant community of diverse races, ethnicities, viewpoints, and backgrounds;

Whereas many African slaves brought to the Americas, including the American colonies later known as the United States, were Muslim and made innumerable contributions to the founding of the United States;

Whereas Muslims of the United States-

- (1) come from a myriad of diverse cultural backgrounds; and
- (2) practice their faith according to a variety of different historical schools of thought and traditions within the Sunni and Shi'a interpretations of Islam;

Whereas Muslims of the United States have long served in the Armed Forces and have fought in all major United States conflicts, from the Revolutionary War onward, with more than 5,000 Muslims serving in the Armed Forces as of April 2019;

Whereas many Muslim members of the Armed Forces have made the ultimate sacrifice for the United States, including—

- (1) Corporal Kareem Rashad Sultan Khan, who was born in 1987 and made the ultimate sacrifice for the United States in 2007; and
- (2) Captain Humayun Saqib Muazzam Khan, who was born in 1976 and made the ultimate sacrifice for the United States in 2004:

Whereas countless Muslims of the United States contribute to the economy and wellbeing of the United States as—

- (1) physicians;
- (2) business owners;
- (3) laborers;
- (4) service workers;
- (5) teachers engaging the next generation of people of the United States; and

(6) police officers, firefighters, and first responders saving lives every day; and

Whereas Muslims of the United States have made and continue to make important contributions to the advancement of the United States that are fundamental to the shared values, society, and culture of the United States, including—

- (1) military veterans, such as-
- (A) Corporal Bampett Muhamed of Virginia, who served in the Revolutionary War;
- (B) Yusuf Ben Ali (also known as "Joseph Benhaley"), who served in the Continental Army under George Washington and fought with General Thomas Sumter in South Carolina: